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【ABSTRACT】
Lately countries have concluded many free trade agreements. However, the puzzle scholars face is why so many countries have rushed to enter a free trade agreement. In this study, I ask how and whether domestic institutions of a country make a difference in committing to tariff reduction agreements. I argue that the rush to PTAs since the 1980s is linked to the domestic constraints. I claim that the propensity of signing a trade agreement increases as the survival of political leaders becomes more dependent on having a large size of winning coalition. (Mansfield 1998) and domestic factors such as preferences of political leaders (Rogowski 1989) , and preferences of pressure groups (Grossman and Helpman 1993) , and political institutions (Milner 1999 ). More recently, scholars have claimed that interplay between domestic institutions and preferences should be incorporated within the literature regarding the recent change of external trade policy across countries (Milner 1999 
Ⅲ. Literature Review
The literature focusing on domestic politics emphasizes the distributional consequences of trade policies for domestic groups. That is, whether a state decides to enter a free trade agreement depends on how much influence different interest groups have in terms of distributional consequences of trade policies (Grossman and Helpman 1993) . In general, scholars posit that the losers will oppose the change of trade policy, while winners will support the change of policy (Rogowski 1989 ). More specifically, scholars provide several perspectives on how trade liberalization will affect the interests of various groups. The Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems demonstrate that interests and preferences of various groups reflect factoral preference. Free trade will benefit the owners of abundant factors and hurt those holding scarce factors. On the other hand, trade protection will harm abundant-factor owners and benefit scarcefactor owners. Factoral models provide an explanation that "trade-policy preferences of different groups will be determined by their countries'relative factor endowments" (Milner 1999 ).
Another main approach to explaining preferences stresses that preferences of various groups reflect sectoral interests. Proponents of sectoral models (Grossman and Helpman 1994) point out weaknesses such as factoral models'assumption of factor mobility between different sectors. In this model, scholars argue that export industries support free trade and import-competing industries lobby for protection. For instance, the government is willing to sign a PTA when it makes reasonable gains for export groups to the partner country given that there are the costs of import competing industries and voters (Grossman and Helpman 1993) .
The empirical evidence on the sectoral-factoral debate is not conclusive. The influence of societal groups cannot be the entire story. Moreover, competition among interest groups to influence governments'policies is usually not structured. Domestic political institutions may structure which groups'preference will be translated to governments'
policies (Garrett and Lange 1995) . It is also necessary to explore such aspects as the ideological orientations of the political leaders and those of their political support bases.
Another main approach highlights the impacts of political institutions on the external policy of trade. In terms of regime type, there are debates over the monadic impact of regime type on the propensity of trade policy. Scholars have found a positive link between international trade and democracy (Gaubatz 1996 , Verdier 1998 , Remmer 1998 ).
Gaubatz argues that democracies are more likely to cooperate for freer trade policy due to the system' s transparency. Barbieri and Schneider, however, draw a different conclusion about the link between democracy and trade(Barbieri and Schneider 1999).
Therefore, debates over the monadic impact of regime type on the propensity of free trade policy are still incomplete (Reinhardt 1996) . Some political scientists discuss the dyadic effect of democracy on trade cooperation (Bliss and Russett 1998, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002) arguing that "democracies are more likely to commit to rules that reflect their institutional biases" (Simmons 2000) . Dixon and Moon suggest that any "two nations with similar regime types are more likely to trade more freely with each other, because similarity decreases political conflict and increases each other' s business exchange" (Reinhardt 1996) . On the other hand, Mansfield, and Bronson(1997) argue that democratic dyads are not more likely to cooperate in terms of treaty counts and trade flows. Strong evidence has not yet been presented about the dyadic effect of democracy on trade cooperation. Simmons suggests that the presence of a democratic regime has no independent effect on the propensity to commit to openness (Simmons 2000) . Moreover, Dai suggests, "domestic political institutions alone are not sufficient to predict a higher level of cooperation among democracies regardless of the preferences of the decision maker" (Dai 2002) .
Democracies "vary widely in the extent to which they are open to interest group pressure"and autocratic countries are more sensitive to small groups of their elites (Reindhart 1996) . In this context, incorporating the more specific features of domestic institution types such as the electoral system, the number of veto players and so forth may be necessary in order to explore variations of international trade policy. Little empirical research has been conducted to "sort out the complex relationship between the different components of domestic institutions and trade policy" ).
There are international explanations of trade policy as well. Neorealist scholars argue that trade cooperation is more likely among allied states that are close in terms of political and military relationship. Hegemonic stability theory emphasizes that powerful states committed to promoting global trade liberalization are the key to successful economic cooperation. Therefore, the erosion of hegemony tends to cause protectionism.
Neo-liberalism argues that international institutions promote cooperation by minimizing collective action problems (Simmons 2000) . Mansfield and Reinhardt(2002) argue that, "developments within the GATT/WTO have influenced when member-states have sought the insurance and bargaining power offered by PTAs."In general, this approach is silent as to why and when political leaders are more or less responsive to interstate commercial cooperation initiatives.
Ⅳ. Variations of Domestic Political Institutions and the Determination to Enter Preferential Trade Agreements
There are "little studies, which systematically explore the domestic institutional structures of government and how these domestic political institutions impact the preferences of decision-makers over trade policy" (Ehrlich 2003) . In this section, I
examine the underexplored linkage between political institutions and the change of trade policies. Understanding the linkage between institutions and trade policy outcomes is significant for grasping the dynamic interplay between the supply side and the demand side of trade policy (Milner 1999 ).
Bueno de Mesquita' s Institutional Theory and International Trade Policy
Political leadership in trade policy-making is an important factor that structures the trade policy preferences of countries (Milner 1999) . We need well-developed theories that show why and how leaders come to prefer to enter a free trade agreement. In this section, I focus on why political leaders commit to a particular trade policy.
Leader' s decisions related to trade policy have domestic distributional and electoral implications. Therefore, deciding whether or not to join trade agreements is a political decision. Leaders are more likely to do what is necessary to satisfy their major constituents'desire in order to retain office. It is assumed that a leaders'political survival depends on successful performance, which is defined by his ability to please the segments of his electoral coalitions. Building from this principle, Bueno de Mesquita provides an interesting perspective for understanding a country' s external trade policy.
As the winning coalition grows, he argues, "the prospects of political survival hinge on successful policy performance" . A winning coalition is defined as "those members of the selectorate whose support is essential to keep the incumbent leadership in office" . The That is, if the size of the winning coalition is larger, more resources will be allocated to produce public goods and therefore better policies such as those which promote free trade will be expected. On the other hand, if the size of a winning 1) There is supportive empirical evidence that poor policy performance increases leaders'risk of being removed, creating an incentive to work hard to prevent policy failure .
coalition is small, poor policy performances are generally expected, because leaders have to use resources to distribute private benefits. Therefore, democratic leaders have a strong incentive to perform well by producing good public policy which autocratic leaders lack. Although this is a simplified explanation of institutions on trade policy choices, the logic of public and private benefits in terms of the strategy of leaders provides a reasonable explanation for the different incentives of leaders regarding a foreign economic policy in different systems. Also, it has been argued that differences within regime types are likely to have more effect on the capacity to initiate trade policy reform than the regime type itself (Milner 1999) . Thus, based on the need to investigate the disaggregated impact of political institutions on the decision to enter a free trade agreement, I examine how changes of international trade policy are influenced by the variations of domestic political institutions.
Veto players 2) and International Trade Policy
Veto players in political systems are an important institutional factor in shaping trade policy. Joining a trade agreement is a change of commercial policy. In democratic systems, the process of policy decision involves a variety of institutional and partisan actors. Under these conditions, certain political institutions make it difficult for the government to adopt policy changes. Tsebelis emphasizes "the capacity for policy change"by differentiating political systems on the basis of "veto players" . Tsebelis defines a veto player as "the number of actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo" . He argues that an increase in the number of veto players increases "policy stability"by impeding significant departures from the status quo (Tsebelis 1995) .
In doing so, Tsebelis claims that countries with many veto players such as coalition governments, bicameral political systems, and presidents with veto power will have a difficulty altering the current policy, resulting in only incremental policy change (Tsebelis 1995) . In other words, we expect countries with many veto players to display a lower likelihood of joining a trade agreement. There is a different expectation related to the argument about the number of veto players. Changing status quo policy to comply with PTA conditions requires the approval of other domestic actors with veto power. In this context, a change-oriented leader makes domestic rejection of these policy changes 2) Some scholars use the notion of divided government in order to explore the impact of political institutions in trade policy making. However, "divided government indicates a simple dichotomy. A more sophisticated distinction is the number of separate veto players. A veto player on a given issue dimension may be the person, political party, or faction of a political party, that exercises a veto on that issue by itself" (Cox and McCubbins 2001) .
more costly by tying their commercial policy to an international trade agreement. In some contexts, policy change inflexibility induces a stronger tendency to join a PTA since decision-makers may strategically use a PTA by making government commitments more costly. In this situation, the number of veto players may not negatively influence the propensity of leaders to join international trade agreements.
Electoral System and International Trade Policy
McGillvray (1997) shows that trade policies may vary according to the types of electoral systems across democracies. Specifically, decision-makers can be more or less insulated from domestic pressures. Some institutions may give interest groups greater access to lobby decision makers. On the other hand, other institutions tend to insulate policy makers from the pressures of interests groups. The electoral system influences the extent of the motivation of decision-makers to respond to pressures from societal groups.
Scholars consider the impact of majoritarian systems and non-majoritarian systems such as an insulated bureaucracy or a legislature elected on the basis of geographic constituencies in determining trade policy. Majoritarian institutions tend to reflect the preferences of the median voter and facilitate the formation of broad-based coalitions.
On the other hand, non-majoritarian institutions are likely to stimulate the growth of specific interests. However, there are some mixed effects. In systems with proportional representation, policy makers are more likely to be isolated from societal pressures for protectionism. In large electoral districts and proportional representation(PR) systems, "pressure groups are restrained where campaign resources or the legal control of nominations are centralized in the hands of party leaders, such control is achieved quite effectively in rigid list system" (Rogowski 1987 ). Thus, there may be a positive relationship between free trade and PR systems. Conversely, Mansfield and Busch claim that larger districts and a PR system result in more protection because of "undermined insulation and autonomy of decision-makers" (Mansfield and Busch 1995) from pressure groups. Therefore, it is less clear that greater insulation of policy makers from societal groups will always produce policies that promote free trade. This proposition regarding the impact of electoral rule needs to be assessed more systematically with alternative explanations, especially those regarding the motivation of leaders to sign a PTA.
Structure of the Government and International Trade Policy
Scholars have demonstrated that divided government structures in presidential systems are associated with a higher level of protectionism (Lohmann and O' Hallonran 1994) . This can be an important variable for understanding decisions to join trade agreements, but there is a debate on this issue among scholars. Divided governments are more likely to have a lower level of trade barriers (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002) , but there are no persuasive theories to explain why divided government is conducive to international cooperation.
Some scholars argue that the congressional delegation of trade policymaking authority to the President allows the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements more effectively (Lohmann and O' Halloran 1994) . They assert that the delegation of trade policymaking authority to the president "eliminated protectionists'logrolling when passing trade legislation and made more salient the costs of tariffs to consumers" . In the same context, Haggard and Kaufman claim that the concentration of trade-policy making capabilities in the hands of the executive branch may motivate strong trade liberalization tendencies across countries (Haggard and Kaufman 1995) .
Many comparative studies also suggest that there are qualitative differences between parliamentary and presidential systems in terms of the process and formulation of their policy making. "In a parliamentary system, the executive and the legislature are often linked. Sometimes the legislature has almost no independent power. It makes the executive leaders the sole relevant policymakers. On the other hand, in a presidential system, both the president and the legislature retain independent power. Relevant policy makers can be found in both branches, suggesting that presidentialism should lead to higher tariffs" (Elrich 2003) . However, if the legislature delegates trade-policy authority to the president, this may change the situation. It is argued that "delegation of trade policy decision authority to presidents and party leaders is significantly related to trade liberalization. Further, presidents are more insulated from interest group pressure than prime ministers. Therefore, with presidential insulation, we expect that presidential system with strong delegating power should reduce protectionists bias and lead to lower tariff as a result" (Nielson 2003) . Therefore, empirical models include the distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism 3) in order to test if presidentialism is more
3) This distinction is a crude measure of executive and legislative relations because there are many institutional variations even among presidential systems and among parliamentary systems. Among presidential systems, presidents have different levels of power over policy making. For example, the president may possess reactive powers, such as the authority to veto or delay legislation. The president may possess a package or line-item veto. Presidents have different levels of proactive power, up to the authority to take unilateral action that does not require legislative approval. These different factors will lead to different effects over international commercial cooperation. "Although the relative merits and consequences of presidential and parliamentary systems have received substantial attention, this distinction between macro institutions is not enough. Explaining political prone to international commercial cooperation such as the conclusion of PTAs. I test this hypothesis by investigating how different government systems influence international commercial cooperation.
Ⅴ. Research Design and Hypotheses
Employing the conclusion of a PTA as a dependent variable is a reasonable way to measure the willingness of a country to cooperate with other countries in liberalizing commerce.
I take preferential trade agreements, free trade agreements, customs union, common markets, and monetary union as dependent variables.
PTA data is derived from the dataset of Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff(2002) . The dependent variable is the occurrence that states form or join a PTA where we observe 1 if this occurs and 0 otherwise for dyad i during year t. That is, it is the binary indicator of whether a dyad forms a PTA in a given year. States are considered to have joined a PTA if they form a new PTA, or if another state joins a PTA in which they are already a member . In order to observe the effect of domestic institutional type in the context of interactive behavior in the international system, I use a dyadic observation as the unit of analysis (Leeds and Davis 1997) , as opposed to simply focusing on the determinants of one state' s trade policy. I test a hypothesis whether a probability of trade cooperation rises as domestic institutions change in dyads.
In order to measure the size of winning coalition and the selectorate, I draw on the Vanhanen Polyarchy dataset. Vanhanen' s(2000) dataset has two indicators: "Participation"
and "Competition" . Two theoretical dimensions of democracy -public contestation and the right to participate -examined by Dahl seem to correspond to those two indicators in the data set that differentiate more democratic systems from less democratic ones.
Legal competition means that individuals and groups are free to organize themselves and to oppose the government. It also indicates the degree to which the freedom of different groups is equal in their competition for power (Vanhanen 2000) . The level of participation is also very crucial in democracy as indicated by the relative number of people taking part in politics. The higher the degrees of competition and participation are, the higher the level of democracy is. The participation variable is a useful measure for the selectorate size, and is measured by the percentage of the population that outcomes often requires greater focus on the details of institutional structure given different institutional arrangements have systematic effects on policy making" (Haggard and McCubbins 2001) .
actually voted in these elections. This variable is prone to large variations even in the same regime.
The measure of winning coalition is the actual size of members of the selectorate whose support is essential to keep the incumbent leadership in office. However, the direct measurement of winning coalition size is more complicated. I use the competition (Vanhanen 2000) and conducted by the state engaging in the most commerce in year t -1" (Mansfield 1998 ).
The geographic distance between countries is also controlled for because this factor stimulates the formation of PTAs (Mansfield 1998 (Milner and Mansfield 1997, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002) . Thus, the model includes the size of their economy(GDP). I use the 
5)
106 The Korean Journal of International Relations, Volume 46, Number 5, 2006 4) "If the home market is large, the pursuit of scale economies through regional agreements will be less important for firms since they may be close to efficient scale already" (Mansfield 1998 ). 5) I omit some economic condition variables because of data constraints.
Ⅵ. Empirical Estimations and Results
The most common techniques for analyzing statistical models with dichotomous dependent variables are logit and probit. However, logit and probit techniques require assumptions of independence among cases that are inappropriate in a time-series cross-section context.
Given that the dependent variable is comprised of the decision to join PTAs over time, there must be autocorrelations from year to year per dyad. 6) To account for this characteristic of the data, I rely on a generalized estimating equation(GEE) to analyze the data. According to Zorn(2001) , the GEE technique is appropriate to use "when the standard assumption that observations in the data are conditionally independent is called into question."GEE analysis uses quasi-maximum likelihood estimation techniques to control the effect of time dependence on observations.
7)
I run the analysis with an indicator for each variable, ascribing the weak link principle.
Following Oneal and Russett' s logic of the "weakest link in the chain,"I identify the lower value of winning coalition size in the two countries as the level of winning coalition size.
That is, I identify the minimum constraint that the size of winning coalition places on the policy coordination with regards to PTAs within the dyad. I use the same method for other main explanatory variables.
Estimation Results
Results from the model show that, except for a few variables, the estimation results are consistent with theoretical expectations. Table 1 presents the results 8) of the effects of domestic competition level (the proxy of winning coalition) on the determination of leaders to commit to policy change for the formation of international trade agreements. The winning coalition size has a strong positive effect on the commitment to tariff reduction agreements. In other words, the 6) It is notable that many of PTAs are interrelated. "The countries of the European Union and Mexico belong to more than 10 agreements. Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile and some Central American countries belong to between 5 and 10 agreements. Most other WTO members belong to at least one agreement. The main exceptions to this pattern are Hong Kong, China, Japan, Macau and Mongolia" (Crawford and Laird 2000) . 7) To correct the temporal grouping of the dependent variable, cubic splines can be included (Beck and Katz 1995) . The splines are designed as a corrective for assuming that observations are timedependent in the time-series cross-sectional framework. However, in this study, I use GEE method instead of using cubic splines approach. It should be noted that using cubic splines as a cure for time dependence effects, does not make a difference in terms of estimation results. I find that leaders have greater political incentives to conclude trade agreements as the size of winning coalition grows. The probability of signing an agreement increases when the survival of political leaders is dependent on the support of a larger winning coalition. The results also suggest that democratic leaders are more likely to form trade agreements with each other. I also find that government structure and the number of veto players have an impact on interstate commercial cooperation. Based on these empirical results, this study demonstrates that domestic institutional constraints provide an important motivation for leaders to pursue PTAs. That is, domestic constraints can clearly influence policy action at the international level. This study suggests that not only does the domestic regime type influence the likelihood of leaders to conclude PTAs, but also that further disaggregated domestic institutions affect this possibility. In doing so, it highlights the fact that institutional analysis makes a significant contribution towards our understanding of international political economy, especially in explaining how and which political institutions are most conducive to a leader' s decision to commit to international trade agreements.
